What Needs to Be Done Now

April 2008 Update: New policy backgrounders will be added soon.

What are the policy experts’ ideas for protecting Darfur? What should ordinary citizens advocate for on the grassroots level? On this page we explain AADG’s Darfur policy positions. If you have fifteen minutes, please read this page: as we pressure our public officials, it’s important that we present them with clear, comprehensive, and actionable policy recommendations for ending the genocide in Darfur.

The following points take into account the recommendations of a number of Africa and Darfur experts, namely John Prendergast, Gayle Smith, Anthony Lake, and Susan Rice. They’ve all presented compelling strategies for ending the genocide; Mr. Prendergast and Ms. Rice recently presented their plans to Congress.

Here are two pressing tasks that Americans Against the Darfur Genocide and its allies are working on right now:

1) Imposing Punitive Measures Now

As Mr. Prendergast and Ms. Rice make clear in their Darfur strategies—and as we made clear last year in our Op-Ed published in The New York Times—the perpetrators of genocide will not change their behavior unless they begin to experience heavy financial, diplomatic, and physical costs for their brazen onslaught. The government of Sudan must begin to realize that there is a real price to pay for committing mass atrocities.

President Bush can introduce and help pass a UN Security Council resolution that imposes asset freezes and travel bans against Sudan’s senior-most dictators and key Janjaweed ringleaders. In the chance that the President cannot secure the acquiescence of China and Russia—two Security Council members with deep economic ties to Sudan—the President should build a coalition of states willing to impose these measures. (For more technical detail on these measures, see pgs. 12-13 of Prendergast’s report.)

The U.S. should make it abundantly clear that these sanctions will not be lifted until Khartoum accepts the complete and unfettered deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur.
In addition, President Bush should fully support the International Criminal Court’s current case on Darfur: access to U.S. intelligence would help the ICC’s investigators speed up the process of issuing indictments against Sudanese government officials. If they are to believe that the international community really cares about the people of Darfur, Khartoum’s leaders should feel all due heat and scrutiny from this court.

Make no mistake: imposing these punitive measures is not a pie-in-the-sky recommendation. The UN has applied such sanctions in previous cases, against other human rights abusers like the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. Here, part of the reasoning behind the sanctions tactic is this: If we cut off the money supply of Sudan’s leaders—if we block their commercial transactions and prevent them from doing business in the international marketplace—then they will be more likely to change their policies on Darfur. They will be more likely to accept UN peacekeepers into Sudan, and they will be more likely to accept a real peace process that addresses the needs and interests of Darfur’s ethnic and political groups.

Please note: The policies mentioned above are very different from the White House’s current “Plan B” for Darfur, which is very, very weak: among other things, at this point Plan B does not seek to impose the multilateral asset freezes mentioned above against Sudan’s senior-most leaders.

2) Accelerating Military Planning and Action for Protection

Ultimately, we cannot take anything for granted with Darfur policy. While the imposition of targeted sanctions has proved historically effective against the Sudanese government, there are no guarantees.
At the end, 100% of our advocacy must be geared towards protecting the people of Darfur. If the imposition of comprehensive sanctions does not lead the perpetrators to accept a UN peacekeeping mission, then the international community and the United States must exert effective military pressure to stop this genocide.
Let’s be clear. The use of force is a contentious topic in today’s political climate. Reasonable people disagree about the proper role of military power in curbing terrorism and fighting wars. In the case of Darfur, though, the paramount thing to remember is that this is genocide. In 1999, our country used air strikes to save the people of Kosovo from a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign—our country did this, despite the fact that the UN Security Council refused to endorse this intervention. The question for us is this: If our country was willing to protect Kosovo, why not Darfur? If we were willing to stop ethnic cleansing, why not stop genocide?

In Congressional testimony on February 8, 2007, Susan Rice explained what should happen if Khartoum does not let in UN peacekeepers after the imposition of targeted sanctions. She addressed both the risks and the reasons for using force. We quote her at length:

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“What I wrote with Anthony Lake and Donald Payne in the Washington Post on October 2, 2006, still applies:”

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“History demonstrates there is one language Khartoum understands: the credible threat or use of force. After 9/11, when President Bush warned states that harbor terrorists, Sudan recalling the 1998 U.S. air-strike on Khartoum, suddenly began cooperating on counter-terrorism. It’s time again to get tough with Sudan.”

“This is what’s needed: After swift diplomatic consultations, the U.S. should press for a Chapter VII UN resolution that issues Sudan an ultimatum: accept the unconditional deployment of the UN force within one week, or face military consequences. The resolution would authorize enforcement by UN member states, collectively or individually. International military pressure would continue until Sudan relents. The U.S., preferably with NATO involvement and African political support, would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft and other military assets. They could blockade Port Sudan, through which Sudan’s oil exports flow. Then, the UN force would deploy—by force, if necessary, with U.S. and NATO backing.”

“If the U.S. fails to gain UN support, we should act without it. Impossible? No, the U.S. acted without UN blessing in 1999 in Kosovo—to confront a lesser humanitarian crisis (perhaps 10,000 killed) and a more formidable adversary. Under NATO auspices, we bombed Serbian targets until Milosevic acquiesced. Not a single American died in combat, and ethnic cleansing ended. Many nations protested that we violated international law but, subsequently, the UN deployed a mission to administer Kosovo and effectively blessed NATO military action retroactively.”

“Unthinkable in the current context? True, the international climate is less forgiving than in 1999. Iraq and torture scandals have left many abroad doubting our motives and legitimacy. Some will reject any future U.S. military action, especially against an Islamic regime, even if purely to halt genocide against Muslim civilians. Sudan has also threatened that Al Qaeda will attack non-African forces in Darfur—a real possibility since Sudan long hosted bin Laden and his businesses. Yet, to allow another state to deter the U.S. by threatening terrorism would set a terrible precedent. It would also be cowardly and, in the face of genocide, immoral.”

“Some will argue the U.S. military cannot take on another mission. Our ground forces are stretched thin. But a bombing campaign or a naval blockade would tax the Air Force and Navy, which have relatively more capacity, and could utilize the 1,500 U.S. military personnel in nearby Djibouti.”

“Others will insist that, without the consent of the UN or a relevant regional body, we would be breaking international law. Perhaps, but the Security Council recently codified a new international norm prescribing—the responsibility to protect. It commits UN members to decisive action, including enforcement, when peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity.”

“This genocide has lasted [over] three long years. Peaceful measures have failed. The Sudanese government is poised to launch a second round of genocide. The real question is this: will we use force to save Africans in Darfur as we did to save Europeans in Kosovo?”

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“This proposal has been controversial.”

“Some analysts prefer the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur to a bombing campaign. Seemingly, they view it as a less aggressive option. It is a fine option, but let’s be clear what it entails. Rather than stand-off air strikes against defined targets, to maintain a no-fly zone would require an asset-intensive, 24 hour per day, 7 day per-week open-ended military commitment in a logistically difficult context. To protect the no-fly area, the air cap would have to disable or shoot down any aircraft that took off in the zone. It would require shutting down Sudanese airfields in and near Darfur to all but humanitarian traffic. In short, it would soon require many of the same steps as are necessary to effect the air strikes we recommend, plus much more.”

“Some humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that air strikes could disrupt humanitarian operations or cause the Government of Sudan to intensify ground attacks against civilians in camps. These are legitimate concerns. The risk is real.”

“Yet, there are ways to mitigate these risks. The targets for bombing could be selected to avoid those airfields used by humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur. To protect civilians at risk, the U.S., France or other NATO countries could position a light quick reaction force in nearby Chad to deter and, when possible respond to, increased attacks against civilians in Darfur and Chad. While the risks may be mitigated, we know they cannot be eliminated.”

“Yet, we also know not just the risk but the daily cost of the status quo—of bluster and retreat. That cost has been and will continue to be: thousands and thousands and thousands more lives each month. That cost is an emboldened Khartoum government that continues to act with impunity. That cost is a regime that literally has gotten away with murder, while the U.S. merely remonstrates.”

“Mr. Chairman, I would submit that this cost is too high. Too many have already died. Too many more are soon to die. When will the Administration finally determine that enough is enough?”

[END]